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Abstract
This essay brings together cognitive literary theory and Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
theory of dialogic imagination to illuminate the construction of social class in 
the eighteenth-century novel. It offers a close reading of selected passages from 
Frances Burney’s Evelina (1778), made possible by combining Bakhtinian 
and cognitive poetics. It also discusses the theoretical ramifications of this 
approach and demonstrates its use in an undergraduate classroom.
Lisa Zunshine is a Bush-Holbrook Professor of English at the University of 
Kentucky, Lexington.
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I have learned to nod sympathetically when my undergraduates, after 
reading the first fifty or so pages of Frances Burney’s Evelina (1778), 
tell me that they find it flowery and wordy. I nod even though a part 
of me imagines asking them, with some indignation: Frances Burney’s 
novel is flowery and wordy? As opposed to what? What are you reading 
currently, compared to which Evelina is not well written enough for 
you? But even as one part of me fumes, another remains optimistic. 
This is my opening, I say to myself. Give me two weeks, and they will 
see that what they cur rently describe as flowery (for they are trying to 
articu late something that is there but for which they do not yet have a 
better name!) is ideology wed to rhetoric with skill, subtlety, and pre-
cision. The opposite of flowery, in other words, whatever that catch-all 
may mean to twenty-year-old readers today.
And so, roughly two weeks later, we come across a passage in which 
one of Evelina’s suitors, a “low-bred”1 young man, Mr Smith, who 
yet wishes to come across as a gentleman, presents her with tickets to a 
ball at the Hampstead Assembly. Evelina, as you may remember, is the 
story of a beautiful young woman who has been brought up in rural 
1  Frances Burney, Evelina, or The History of a Young Lady’s Entrance into the World, ed. 
Edward A. Bloom, intro. and notes Vivien Jones (1778; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 180. References are to this edition.
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seclu sion and is now entering London. She is a daughter of a baronet, 
who abandoned her mother shortly after their marriage and burned the 
mar riage certificate. This means that, though by birth and education she 
belongs to the aristocracy, her social status is ambiguous, at least until 
her father publicly acknowledges her as his legitimate heiress. Until that 
happens, she is subject to amorous advances by men from an unusually 
wide social spectrum, from shopkeepers to aristocrats, each with his own 
way of speaking and pressing his suit. Mr Smith may be said to press his 
in a particularly obnoxious fashion, for Evelina had told him earlier that 
she did not want to go to the ball, and he has simply ignored her words.
Today Evelina does not just say no. Her answer is couched in such 
terms so as to emphasize her incompatibility with Mr Smith.2 He under-
stands only part of what she says and cannot respond properly. This is 
an important detail because men from the social class to which she 
anxiously defends her right to belong would have understood and re-
sponded in kind (even those of them, such as Sir Clement Willoughby, 
whose courtship style is obnoxious in its own way).
Here is their conversation. Evelina has reminded Mr Smith that she 
had already told him that she would not go to the Assembly.
“Lord, Ma’am,” cried he, “how should I suppose you was in earnest? come, 
come, don’t be cross; here’s your Grandmama ready to take care of you, so 
you can have no fair objection, for she’ll see that I don’t run away with you. 
Besides, Ma’am, I got the tickets on purpose.”
“If you were determined, Sir,” said I, “in making me this offer, to allow 
me no choice of refusal or acceptance, I must think myself less obliged to 
your intention than I was willing to do.”
“Dear Ma’am,” cried he, “you’re so smart, there is no speaking to you;—
indeed you are monstrous smart, Ma’am! but come, your Grandmama 
shall ask you, and then I know you’ll not be so cruel.” (220)
Evelina and Mr Smith may as well have been speaking two different 
languages, so loud is the clash of their sensitivities and the social incom-
mensurability that it implies. Yet how is this impression created? That 
is, what tools do we have at our disposal to explain the rhetorical effect 
2  Not only does Evelina signal to Mr Smith her social superiority, but she also manages to 
do so without offending her grandmother, Mme Duval, who is present and quite happy 
with Mr Smith’s courtship of her granddaughter. Here, as on many other occasions, 
Evelina’s speech manifests the quality of “double-edgedness,” discussed by Julia Epstein 
in The Iron Pen: Frances Burney and the Politics of Women’s Writing (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 111.
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of their exchange? Left to their own devices, students consider Evelina’s 
elaborate phrasing a prime example of what they call “flowery” and 
“wordy,” while Mr Smith’s speech is mainly “choppy.” Can we do better 
than that?
Bakhtinian Poetics
If we want to do better, one good place to start is Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
concept of heteroglossia. Novels, in Bakhtin’s view, are constructed “out 
of heteroglot, multi-voiced, multi-styled and often multi-languaged 
ele ments.”3 One of the “compositional-stylistic unities” (though by no 
means the most important one) making up “the novelistic whole” is the 
“styl istically individualized speech of characters.”4 Although Burney was 
not on Bakhtin’s radar when he wrote Discourse in the Novel (unlike, for 
instance, Henry Fielding, Laurence Sterne, and Tobias Smollett), her 
writ ing seems to exemplify what he called a comic style “of the English 
sort”: one based on “the stratification of the common language.”5 The 
“verbally and semantically autonomous”6 ways in which Burney’s char-
acters speak under score their largely immutable class positions. It is 
hetero glossia in service of ideology.
Some sociolectal markers pointing to Evelina’s and Mr Smith’s class 
differences seem to be obvious. In contrast with Evelina’s polished way 
of speaking, Mr Smith uses short, clipped clauses (“don’t be cross”) and 
vulgar expressions that brand him as a shopkeeper aspiring to sound gen-
teel, such as “monstrous smart.” His grammar is bad (“you was”). He 
betrays his crassness by reminding her that he paid for the tickets (“I got 
the tickets on purpose”). It is all here.
Cognitive Poetics
But something else is here too. To see it, we turn to cognitive literary 
theory,7 a field that has roots in cognitive science but has come into its 
3  M.M. Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. 
and trans. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1982), 265.
4  Bakhtin, 262.
5  Bakhtin, 308.
6  Bakhtin, 315.
7  The particular theoretical commitment of this essay, that is, its focus on the construction 
of fictional consciousness as fused with ideology, places it within two critical traditions 
  of exploring fictional minds. One, narratological, is represented by such works as 
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own in the last decade, with hundreds of studies that integrate insights 
from cognitive psychology and neuroscience with goals and methods of 
literary criticism.8 In particular, we look at research on embedded mental 
states in fiction, an exciting recent offshoot of studies in “theory of mind” 
aka “mindreading” (that is, our tendency to explain observable behaviour 
as caused by underlying mental states, such as thoughts, desires, and 
intentions).9
Cognitive scientists who work with theory of mind use the term 
“embedment” to describe thoughts and feelings nested within each other, 
as in, “she didn’t realize that he wanted to surprise her.” While they focus 
on embedded mental states that structure daily social interactions,10 
literary scholars explore embedments that emerge as we read fiction.  It 
seems that to make sense of what’s going on in a play, a novel, or a narra-
tive poem, we continuously embed within each other mental states of its 
characters and, when appropriate, of its narrator, author, and readers.11
Dorrit Cohn, Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Alan Palmer, Fictional Minds (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2004); Palmer, Social Minds in the Novel (Columbus: 
Ohio State University Press, 2010); and David Herman, Story Logic: Problems and 
Possibilities of Narrative (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004). Another, 
historicist, is represented by such studies as Ellen Spolsky, Satisfying Skepticism: 
Embodied Knowledge in the Early Modern World (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); and Alan 
Richardson, The Neural Sublime: Cognitive Theories and Romantic Texts (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).
 8  For reviews of the field, see Alan Richardson, “Studies in Literature and Cognition: 
A Field Map,” in The Work of Fiction: Cognition, Culture, and Complexity, ed. Alan 
Richardson and Ellen Spolsky (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 1–29; and Lisa 
Zunshine, “Introduction to Cognitive Literary Studies,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Cognitive Literary Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1–9.
 9  For a recent comprehensive review of research on theory of mind, see Ian Apperly, 
Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of “Theory of Mind” (New York: Psychology Press, 
2011).
10  See Rebecca Saxe and Nancy Kanwisher, “People Thinking about Thinking People: 
The Role of the Temporo-parietal Junction in ‘Theory of Mind,’” NeuroImage 19, no. 4 
(2003): 1835–42, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12948738; and Wanqing 
Li, Xiaoqin Mai, and Chao Liu, “The Default Mode Network and Social Understand ing 
of Others: What Do Brain Connectivity Studies Tell Us,” Fron tiers in Human Neuro-
science 8:74 (2014): n.p., doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00074.
11  See Zunshine, “The Secret Life of Fiction,” PMLA 130, no. 3 (2015): 724–31, doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2015.130.3.724; Max J. Van Duijn, Ineke Sluiter, and 
Arie Verhagen, “When Narrative Takes Over: The Representation of Em bed ded 
Mind states in Shakespeare’s Othello,” Language and Literature 24, no. 2 (2015): 148–66, 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963947015572274; Haiyan Lee, “Chinese Feelings: 
Notes on a Ritual Theory of Emotion,” Wenshan Review of Literature and Culture 9, no. 2 
(2016): 1–37; D.H. Whalen, Zunshine, and Michael Holquist, “Increases in Perspective 
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Some of those embedments are merely implied by the text, while 
others are explicitly spelled out. For instance, we understand why Romeo 
kills himself when he discovers Juliet’s lifeless body. We know that he does 
not know that she is alive and that she merely wanted some people to 
think that she is dead. This is an implied embedment. In contrast, the Old 
English poem “The Wanderer,” dated somewhere between the late sixth 
and the early tenth century, spells out the narrator’s feelings as he wonders 
at why he is not depressed when he thinks about death:
Indeed I cannot think
why my spirit
does not darken
when I ponder on the whole
life of men
throughout the world,
How they suddenly
left the floor (hall),
the proud thanes.”12
Another explicit embedment, from Robinson Crusoe: “I know not what 
it was, but something shocked my mind at that thought, and I durst not 
speak the words. ‘How canst thou become such a hypocrite,’ said I, even 
audibly, ‘to pretend to be thankful for a condition which, however thou 
mayest endeavour to be contented with, thou wouldst rather pray heartily 
to be delivered from?’”13 Crusoe is shocked that he would pretend to be 
grateful for the condition that he would, in fact, prefer to escape.14
In the eighteenth-century Chinese novel Dream of the Red Chamber 
(aka The Story of the Stone) by Cao Xueqin, an aristocratic young lady, 
Wang Xi-feng, offers her husband, Jia Lian, to exchange her maid, 
Patience, for a new “chamber wife” for him.15 But even as she does it, 
we know (another implied embedment of mental states!) that she knows 
Embedding Increase Reading Time Even with Typical Text Presentation: Implications for 
the Reading of Literature,” Frontiers in Psychology (24 November 2015): n.p., doi: http://
dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01778.
12  “The Wanderer,” http://www.anglo-saxons.net/hwaet/?do=get&type=text&id=wdr, 
accessed 30 July 2017.
13  Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe (1719; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 97.
14  For a discussion of embedment in “The Wanderer” and Robinson Crusoe, see Zunshine, 
“The Commotion of Souls,” SubStance 45, no. 2 (2016): 118–42, http://muse.jhu.
edu/article/628001.
15  Cao Xueqin, “The Golden Days,” vol. 1 in The Story of the Stone, trans. David Hawkes 
(pub. 1791; London: Penguin, 1973), 310. References are to this edition.
114
ECF 30, no. 1 © 2017 McMaster University
Lisa Zunshine
quite well that he understands she is merely playing with him and would 
never allow him to have another concubine, nor would she want to part 
with her trusted Patience. And when Patience lies to Jia Lian, within Xi-
feng’s hearing, that a pretty girl has come with a message for Patience, she 
knows that, jealous as Xi-feng might be, she would eventually be grateful 
to her for making Jia Lian think of that girl and distracting him from 
the real purpose of the messenger. When Jia Lian steps out of the room, 
Patience explains to Xi-feng what she had in mind. Implied and explicitly 
spelled-out embedments thus often coexist on the same page, indeed, in 
the same sentence, reinforcing and complicating each other.
One important interpretive payoff of looking at fiction through the 
lens of cognitive literary theory is the realization that writers portray some 
characters as capable of embedding more mental states than others—a 
difference that can be underwritten by considerations of class, race, and 
gender.16 For instance, in the above example from Dream of the Red 
Chamber, the cat-and-mouse games that Xi-Feng and Patience play 
with Jia Lian are in keeping with a gender pattern we find elsewhere 
in the novel. Known for his nostalgic sympathy towards his young fe-
male characters,17 Cao Xueqin consistently depicts them one step ahead 
of men, that is, embedding mental states on a higher, or deeper, level.18
Cognition and Ideology
When I teach Evelina, I introduce my undergraduates to Bakhtin and 
heteroglossia but not necessarily to theory of mind. Especially if we are 
strapped for time, a comprehensive theoretical buildup from cognitive 
science may not be needed for an introduction to literature course19 (as 
different, for instance, from a seminar on literary theory with a strong 
cognitive studies component). All we need is one concept—embedded 
(aka “nested”) mental states—and that can be explained in ten minutes, 
with a chalkboard drawing of a circle within a circle within a circle.
16  For a comparative study of the role of gender in fictional mind reading, see Barbara 
Simerka, Knowing Subjects: Cognitive Cultural Studies and Early Modern Spanish 
Literature (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2013), 23–80. 
17  David Hawkes, introduction to “The Golden Days,” by Cao Xueqin, 20.
18  See Zunshine, “From the Social to the Literary: Approaching Cao Xueqin’s The Story 
of the Stone (Honglou meng 紅樓夢) from a Cognitive Perspective,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies, 176–96. See also Lee, 25.
19  Though, see Peter Rabinowitz and Corinne Bancroft, “Euclid at the Core: Recen-
tering Literary Education,” Style 48, no. 1 (2014): 1–34, http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 
10.5325/style.48.1.1.
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For instance, “She wants him to know that she is angry at him for for-
getting her birthday”—four concentric circles with “wants” in the outer-
most layer and “forgetting” in the innermost—represents four men tal 
states embedded within each other. “He is sad because he wants to be with 
his family”—two concentric circles—two embedded mental states. “I 
want to go shopping”—one mental state. “I went shopping on Friday”—
no mental states.20
When we return to the conversation between Mr Smith and Evelina 
and examine what they say specifically in terms of the number of em-
bedded mental states, we notice right away that Mr Smith’s embed-
ments, both implied and explicit, stay around the second level, whereas 
Evelina spouts third-to-fourth-level embedments one after another. 
Here is one way to map their exchange:
“Lord, Ma’am,” cried he, “how should I suppose you was in earnest? come, 
come, don’t be cross; here’s your Grandmama ready to take care of you, 
so you can have no fair objection, for she’ll see that I don’t run away with 
you. Besides, Ma’am, I got the tickets on purpose.” [Who would think 
that you meant what you said? (two embedded mental states). I know that 
you worry that there will be no chaperone (two embedded mental states).]
“If you were determined, Sir,” said I, “in making me this offer, to allow 
me no choice of refusal or acceptance, I must think myself less obliged to 
your intention than I was willing to do.” [I might have felt bad turning you 
down had I thought that you were aware of my feelings enough to care to 
give me a choice (at least three, perhaps four embedded mental states). But 
because now I know that you would not even consider that I may not want 
to go, I intend not to feel bad about disappointing you (two parallel sets of 
three embedded mental states).]
“Dear Ma’am,” cried he, “you’re so smart, there is no speaking to you;—
indeed you are monstrous smart, Ma’am! but come, your Grandmama 
shall ask you, and then I know you’ll not be so cruel.” [I know that you 
are too smart for me (two embedded mental states). I hope you will listen 
to your Grandmama (two embedded mental states). I know that you will 
agree eventually (two embedded mental states).]
At this point, I usually ask my students to consider the pattern of 
embedment exhibited by two men, Sir Clement Willoughby and Lord 
20  For a discussion of mental states found even in constructions seemingly devoid of any 
intentionality, see D.H. Whalen, Zunshine, Evelyne Ender, Jason Tougaw, Robert F. 
Barsky, Peter Steiner, Eugenia Kelbert, and Michael Holquist, “Validating Judgments 
of Perspective Embedding: Further Explorations of a New Tool for Literary Analysis,” 
Scientific Study of Literature 6, no. 2 (2016): 278–97.
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Orville, who belong to the aristocracy, that is, the social class within 
which Evelina, a daughter of a baronet, will be eventually ensconced. 
Here are two typical examples of their speeches. (I quote them here out 
of context, but it is similar in both cases: each man wants to influence 
Evelina by disposing her more favourably towards himself.)
Sir Clement Willoughby: “You cannot even judge of the cruelty of my 
fate; for the ease and serenity of your mind incapacitates you from feeling 
for the agitation of mine!” (327). [We may map this as, I appreciate that 
your state of mind makes it impossible for you understand how unhappy I 
am (at least three, possibly four embedded mental states).]
 
Lord Orville: “I greatly fear that I have been so unfortunate as to offend 
you; yet so repugnant to my very soul is the idea, that I know not how 
to suppose it possible I can unwittingly have done the thing in the world 
that, designedly, I would wish to avoid” (330–31). [We may map this 
as, You must believe that I am distressed to realize that I have made you 
feel precisely the way I would never want to make you feel (at least four 
embedded mental states).]
Mr Smith’s limited capacity for embedding mental states is thus 
dialogic 21—another key concept from Bakhtin—that is, we may exper-
ience it as limited only in contrast with the embedments of other char-
acters, such as Evelina, Sir Clement Willoughby, and Lord Orville. Once 
we become aware of this contrast, we realize that it is used throughout 
the novel in two related but not identical ways. 
First, it marks bona fide, as opposed to in-name-only, gentility. That 
is, “real” gentlemen and gentle women, such as Lady Howard, Mr Villars, 
Mrs Selwyn, and Mr Macartney, who also happen to treat Evelina with 
kindness and respect, con sistently embed mental states at and above the 
third level, while the nominally genteel characters who insult, ignore, and 
exploit her, such as Lord Merton, Lady Louisa Larpent, Mr Lovel, and 
Captain Mirvan, stay around a lower (that is, second) level.22 
Besides marking “true” gen tility, the differential capacity for embed-
ding is also used to naturalize char acters’ social status. Shopkeepers and 
parvenus with shopkeeper mentality do not rise above the second level in 
21  See Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World (London: Routledge, 1990), 
154–55.
22  As Brian McCrea puts it, building on Michael McKeon’s concept of “status incon-
sistency,” Burney’s “satire upon Mr. Smith doesn’t imply an endorsement of characters 
like Coverley and Merton.” McCrea, Frances Burney and Narrative Prior to Ideology 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2013), 54.
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their attribution of mental states. Thus, Evelina’s low-born cousin Tom 
Branghton: “There is nothing but quarreling with the women; it’s my 
belief they like it better than victuals and drink” (221), or her ex-barmaid 
grandmother, Mme Duval: “I’ve no doubt but we shall be all murdered!” 
(146), or Biddy Branghton: “I wonder when Mr. Smith’s room will be 
ready” (177). If you consider the dismal treatment that these characters 
receive throughout the novel, it seems that the lack of capacity for em-
bedding mental states on a high level marks pretty much everyone 
belonging to this class as not worthy of compassion and sympathy.
The capacity for embedment thus functions as a form of hetero-
glossia. It can be combined with other sociolectal markers, but only 
for those char acters who are incapable of sophisticated layering of 
social con sciousness. Thus Tom Branghton’s low-level embedments go 
hand-in-hand with contractions, clipped sentences, and colloquialisms: 
“Didn’t you [hear of it], Miss? ... why then you’ve a deal of fun to come, 
I’ll promise you; and, I tell you what, I’ll treat you there some Sunday 
noon” (188); Mme Duval’s, with contractions, double negatives, and 
bad French: “Pardie, no—you may take care of yourself, if you please, 
but as to me, I promise you I sha’n’t trust myself with no such person” 
(206). Lord Merton, a newly titled nobleman who lacks true gentility, 
punctuates his first-level embedments with curses: “I don’t know what 
the devil a woman lives for after thirty” (275). Captain Mirvan, another 
character whose behaviour belies his nominal status of gentleman, 
sprinkles his second-level embedments23 with sailor’s lingo: “I am now 
upon a hazardous expedition, having undertaken to convoy a crazy 
vessel to the shore of Mortification” (141).24
In comparison, the speech of unambiguously genteel characters is 
largely devoid of such markers. The only feature that is reliably present—
and thus should be considered a marker in its own right—is the ability 
23  That Captain Mirvan seems to embed mental states on the second level more con-
sistently than, say, Mme Duval or the Branghtons (who tend to stay around the first 
level), may reflect his peculiar role in Evelina. As Ruth Bernard Yeazell observes, 
“Though there is scarcely a character in the novel who seems more distant from 
Evelina than this crude ex-sailor, he nonetheless has a remarkable tendency to aim 
his practical jokes at targets whom she herself has strong motives to attack.” Yeazell, 
Fictions of Modesty: Women and Courtship in the English Novel (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), 141.
24  See Francesca Saggini’s Backstage in the Novel: Frances Burney and the Theater Arts 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012) for a discussion of Burney’s pos-
sible appropriation of the “long-established theatrical technique of employing par-
ticular speech patterns for characterization” (78) in her representation of Captain 
Mirvan and Mme Duval.
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to embed mental states on a high level. “Can there, my good Sir, be any 
thing more painful to a friendly mind, than a necessity of communicat-
ing disagreeable intelligence?” (13); “I am grieved, Madam, to appear 
obstinate, and I blush to incur the imputation of selfishness” (19); “The 
benevolence with which you have interested yourself in my concerns, 
induces me to suppose you would wish to be acquainted with the cause 
of that desperation from which you snatched me” (227); “I am extremely 
sorry ... that you think me too presumptuous” (355); “To what, my Lord, 
must I, then, impute your desire of knowing [my intentions]?” (257).
Lady Howard, Mr Villars, Mr Macartney, Lord Orville, and even Sir 
Clement Willoughby (except when he tries to overwhelm Evelina with 
his dramatic professions of devotion and overblown terms of endear-
ment) sound nearly interchangeable in their complex embedments. It is 
almost as if the relentlessly demanding pattern of such embedments were 
too metabolically costly for the text, leaving little energy for further 
verbal idiosyncrasies to be associated with these characters.
Note, finally, that the differential capacity for embedment does not 
map well onto E.M. Forster’s classic distinction between “flat” and 
“round” characters, although it might seem that it would.25 For instance, 
Mr Smith may come across as more “round” than Lady Howard, even 
though she embeds mental states on a higher level than he does. As 
Natalie M. Phillips observes in her recent cognitive historicist study, 
Distraction: Problems of Attention in Eighteenth-Century Literature, if 
“tradi tional models of characterization continue to use Forster’s volu-
metrics for measuring the fictional mind,” a cognitively inflected analy-
sis (in Phillips’s case, analyzing characters’ styles of attention) “reveals a 
broader range of traits to apply in literary criticism.”26 The sociocogni tive 
com plexity of characters, that is, their relative capacity for embedding 
mental states, emerges as one such trait, although at this point it is 
a wide open question what role specific historical milieus, ideological 
prero gatives, and culturally ascendant genres play in its emergence. 
Pedagogical Payoff
Introducing students to embedded mental states as a form of Bakhtinian 
heteroglossia is not a gratuitous exercise in literary theorizing on the 
undergraduate level. Instead, it is a way of building on their intuition to 
25  E.M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1927), 108. 
26  Natalie M. Phillips, Distraction: Problems of Attention in Eighteenth-Century Literature 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 179–80.
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help them see how fiction can naturalize social class. In calling Burney’s 
writing “wordy” and “flowery,” they may already be picking up on its 
underlying sociocognitive pattern: the consistently high level of embed-
ment of mental states structuring thoughts and speeches of upper-class 
characters. Cognitive literary theory allows us to articulate this pattern 
and recognize its possible function within the text: manipulation and 
reimagining of social cognition in service of ideology.
The same theory also helps students crack the code of genteel (or 
“polite”)27 talk in eighteenth-century fiction. One exercise that we do 
in class is to take a statement and envelop it in several layers of mental 
states, paying attention to what it does to our perception of the speaker’s 
social standing. “We lost our way” seems to be neutral; a foot man may 
say that, but so may a clergyman. But put it side by side with “I fear we 
lost our way” and ask yourself which phrase is more likely to be uttered 
by footman and which by clergyman. By adding a mental state, we move 
the speaker up one notch in the social hierarchy. Just so, “I hope you 
will not think me too rash if I tell you that I fear we lost our way” (three 
embed ded mental states!) marks the speaker’s gentility more surely than 
would an expensive gown or a sword. What used to be experienced as 
“wordiness” can now be seen as ideologically laden signalling.
Note that “wordiness” does not actually mean “more words.” True, 
in my “we lost our way” example, sentences get longer as the number of 
embedded mental states increases. In actual works of fiction, however, 
multiply layered consciousness can be conveyed with elegance and 
economy. For instance, Mr Villars’s “I blush to incur the imputation of 
selfishness” contains three embedded mental states, yet it is shorter than 
Mme Duval’s “Pardie, no—you may take care of yourself, if you please, 
but as to me, I promise you I sha’n’t trust myself with no such person,” 
which contains, at most, two embedded mental states. Particularly when 
embedments are implied—deduced from the context rather than spelled 
out—sentence length ceases to be a decisive factor.
27  For a useful review of the eighteenth-century notion of politeness, see John Brewer, 
The Pleasures of the Imagination: English Culture in the Eighteenth Century (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 89–90. For a suggestive discussion of politeness in specifically cogni-
tive terms, see Phillips. Quoting from Lord Chesterfield, who suggested that a polite 
person “should not only have attention to every thing, but a quickness of attention, 
so as to observe, at once, all the people in the room; their motions, their looks, and 
their words; and yet without staring at them, and seeming to be an observer,” Phillips 
writes that eighteenth-century “politeness relied on skillful divisions of focus, facilitating 
full comprehension of a social scene” (174). Note that “full com pre hension of a social 
scene” can also be modelled as embedded consciousness (for example, being aware of 
“the people in the room’s” awareness of your behaviour, such as staring).
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By the end of their third week with Burney, my students are usually 
well attuned to the differential embedment of mental states and have 
seen how it contributes to the construction of class difference in Evelina. 
Sometimes, at this point, I ask them to pen a letter on behalf of one of the 
characters, something that he or she may write to an absent friend, telling 
that friend about the recent events at Howard Grove—for instance, about 
the fake robbery that Captain Mirvan staged to “mortify” Mme Duval. As 
they read their letters out loud, their classmates are invited to guess which 
character is being impersonated, which they successfully do.
Here are several of those letters, arranged in ascending order: from the 
lowest level of embedded mental states to the highest.28
You a’nt gon’ believe what happened to me ’bout a day ago! You best read 
this close and you’ll get a good laugh. We was wandering home at night 
and ’bout halfway lost and thieves came up us. They ’bout scared me 
halfway to death, but Madame Duval, she was goin’ crazy, They took her 
and all her fancy clothes and hair and whatnot and they chucked her down 
in the dirt. They ain’t hurt her or nothin, but they got riled up real good. 
Me and the boys were about to lose it, but we had to try not to laugh till 
we got home. Turned out, it was just some rich boys playin’ some kind’a 
trick. I sure got a kick out’a it. I couldn’t look her in the eye, scared I was 
gonna get it, but I wasn’t gonna stand up to some robbers over a few of 
Madame Duval’s things; she got plenty. [A coachman from the Howard 
Grove; zero to first-level embedment of mental states.]
*****
I regret to inform you that recently I was treated in the most despicable 
manner. Believe me, I warrant that nobody never was so abused before. A 
robber verily came and dragged me out of my chariot. Never nobody was 
so unlucky as I am. I’ve never been so bad off, Mon Dieu! He shook me, 
tied me up with rope, I was sure I’d have me murdered. I hope the villain 
is hanged. He’ll certainly be found out, for I’ll get the justice to stop him! 
The worst thing is that the villain lost my curls! I’ll never rest until he gets 
what’s coming even if it costs me all my fortune. [Mme Duval; first- to 
second-level embedment of mental states.]
*****
As one of my chosen crew, I cannot help but believe that you would find 
as much enjoyment as I in my own actions. My fellow mate and I set 
about on our hazardous expedition for the sake of a particular madam, 
whom you may recall from my past transmission to you. We came upon 
28  I am grateful to Ann Baillie, Akesha Kirkpatrick, Jacob McLees, Krista Parr, Alison 
Power, Logan Ragsdale, Harry Standafer, Randi Walker, and Jordan Wick for letting 
me use their letters for this essay.
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her vessel disguised most cleverly, so that she shan’t have recognized us to 
be from her earlier party, and proceeded to trick her into mortification. 
Could you believe, my dear friend, that she believed herself to have been 
robbed? She would hardly be worth the time to actually rob—all I believe 
her to be good for is a good joke, that old woman, and hardly anything 
more. She is worth, in my eyes, about as much as the ditch and tree we 
thus tied her to. The servants that had joined in our expedition could 
hardly help but laugh at the lady’s reactions, though I cannot charge them 
with mutiny for something such as that, she had no way of knowing it was 
I simply by their laughter, and I myself had a difficult time containing my 
laughter. [Captain Mirvan; mostly second level of embedment.]
*****
My dear friend, I want to ask you, can in life there exist anything more 
challenging to both the mind and patience than an act of unkindness? I 
hope you will not mind if I report to you the strange occurrence of events 
that hath passed here at Howard Grove these last days.
That horrible Madame Duval—the ignorant French woman I assume 
you recall my mentioning to you—has been the victim of an act of cruelty 
by [one of the residents of ] the Grove ... 
I do not imagine that it is necessary to explain to you how I feel on the 
matter, as I believe you know I see this punishment fitting for a woman so 
cruel ... Further, the horrid woman was accompanied by my young charge, 
and I know you will agree that she should have nothing to do with the 
matter. [Lady Howard; third level of embedment.]
Given that this particular group of students had twenty minutes to come 
up with their letters, they appear to have captured quite well something of 
the peculiar idiom associated with different social classes in Burney’s novel. 
This, I believe, is the direct effect of introducing them to the expanded 
definition of heteroglossia, one that includes not only professional lingos, 
conventional sociolects, and colloquialisms, but also, when appropriate, 
differential embedment of mental states.
Beyond “Evelina”
I said before that the characters who function on the first and second level 
of embedment do not, as a rule, elicit much reader compassion. (As one 
of my students put it, referring to the cruel prank that Captain Mirvan 
plays on Mme Duval, “I didn’t care about Mme Duval’s suffering. It’s one 
bad character playing a trick on another bad character.”29) It also works 
29  Jane Spencer concurs: “On the whole the novel shows remarkably little sympathy 
for a grandmother deprived of her grandchild.” Spencer sees this as part of the 
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the other way around. The characters who are portrayed as being able to 
afford the cognitive luxury of consistently embedding mental states on 
this high level come across as more aware of their own30 and, frequently, 
other people’s feelings31 and hence are seen as more deserving of readers’ 
interest and sympathy.
To the extent that low-level embedment is class-driven,32 we can partly 
chalk it up to Burney’s willingness to rely on the conventional association 
between landed property and “social personality.”33 At least in this par-
ticular regard, she is perhaps not yet the Burney who, as Margaret Anne 
Doody puts it, would “examine” and “attack” rather than merely reflect 
“her society in its structure, functions, and beliefs,” especially those 
pertaining to “social class.”34 (That will change in Cecilia.)
general pattern informing Burney’s narrative: “With its strong emotional investment 
in the heroine’s relationship to her father and to father figures, Evelina honours the 
patriline and is ambivalent about the matriline.” Spencer, “Evelina and Cecilia,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Frances Burney, ed. Peter Sabor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 27. While I agree with Spencer’s analysis, my focus here is on 
specific rhetorical strategies (such as low-level embedment of mental states associated 
with her) that make Mme Duval a less sympathetic character than her personal losses 
might have entitled her to be. See also Kristina Straub’s useful discussion of the novel’s 
divided consciousness when it comes to the treatment of older women, such as Mme 
Duval, in Divided Fictions: Fanny Burney and Feminine Strategy (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1987), 30.
30  Which may work, as it does more often than not in Evelina’s case, as a heightened 
awareness of one’s own feelings (for example, shame) in response to other people’s 
perceptions of oneself, what Yeazell calls Evelina’s “obsession with watching herself 
being watched” (123).
31  As Epstein puts it, Mme Duval’s “roughhewn sensibility makes it impossible for her 
to empathize with others” (113). 
32  Compare to what Phillips describes as the stereotype of cognitive inferiority of 
female servants in eighteenth-century fiction, that is, the depiction of servants, 
such as Susannah from Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy (1767), as “soft-brained 
and distraction-prone” (107).
33  J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, 
Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
119. Of course, the dynamic of the relationship between social class and cognitive 
complexity can be reversed. For a compelling example of such a reversal, see Ellen 
Bayuk Rosenman, “Rudeness, Slang, and Obscenity: Working-Class Politics in London 
Labour and the London Poor,” in Victorian Vulgarity: Taste in Verbal and Visual Culture, 
ed. Susan David Bernstein and Elsie B. Michie (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). Rosenman 
demonstrates that the working poor can be presented as having a more “layered con-
sciousness of social interactions” and thus “the most satisfying understanding” of a 
social situation in comparison with middle-class “experts” (57–58).
34  Margaret Anne Doody, Frances Burney: The Life in the Works (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1988), 3. 
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To the extent that low-level embedment is driven by character flaws, 
as in the case of Lord Merton, Mr Lovel, and Captain Mirvan, we can 
attribute it to what seems to be a literary tradition (dating back at least 
to Cervantes’s Don Quixote35 and perhaps even to Apuleius’s The Golden 
Ass and Heliodorus’s An Ethiopian Romance)36 of correlat ing characters’ 
inability to entertain complex embedments with their relative lack of 
sympathetic appeal—relative, that is, always in comparison to “high-
embedders.” 
This tradition is far from unambiguous. High-embedders may come 
across as sensitive and intelligent people, or they may come across as 
peculiarly misguided, betrayed as it were by their socio cog ni tive com -
plexity into ethically questionable or socially debili tating behaviour. (And 
not to forget about evil masterminds, whose hubristic Machia vellian ism 
may render them abhorrent in the eyes of the reader.)37 Still, there seems 
to be more than enough sympathetic high-embedders around for us to 
assume that this kind of complexity is more often an asset rather than a 
liability when it comes to fictional characterization.
We can observe something roughly similar in real-life social inter-
actions. We like people who strike us as having a deeper awareness of 
social dynamics and their own thought processes, while, at the same time, 
we feel wary of those who use that deeper awareness to further their own 
ends. We maintain a fine distinction between “insightful,” “sensitive,” and 
“socially astute” on the one hand, and “manipulative” and “Machiavellian” 
on the other, even though they may all embed mental states on the same 
(high) level.
It is a fascinating experience to read Burney’s letters and diaries writ-
ten around the time she was working on Evelina with attention to their 
embedded mental states.38 While I have been unable to establish an un-
am biguous correlation between high-level embedment and social class, 
there is certainly a correlation between high-level embedment and per-
sonal amicability. To put it bluntly, people who are kind to Burney and 
35  See Simerka, chapter 7.
36  See Zunshine, “The Commotion of Souls,” 127–29.
37  Compare to Blakey Vermeule’s important discussion of masterminds in Why Do We 
Care about Literary Characters? (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 
86.
38  As far as I know, the journals have not been explored as to their possible heteroglossia, 
although, as John Wiltshire observes, they “take the form of dramatic action, with 
extensive dialogue and representation of ‘characters’ through their speech.” Wiltshire, 
“Journals and Letters,” in The Cambridge Companion to Frances Burney, 80–81.
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dear to her are shown to possess a richly layered social consciousness, just 
like the people who are kind and dear to Evelina. 
For instance, Burney’s letter to her friend and her literary mentor, 
Samuel Crisp (aka “Daddy Crisp”), of 7 February 1774, contains a 
plea, which—though playful rather than sentimental, as the context 
makes clear—is not unworthy, in its nestings, of Lord Orville. That is, 
both Daddy Crisp and Frances are portrayed as embedding mental states 
on a high level.
But, if by any chance, I have been so unfortunate as to offend you,—
though I can hardly suppose it—I intreat you, my dear Sir, not to 
punish me with silent resentment. I would rather receive from you the 
severest lecture you could pen, because while I might flatter myself with 
even meriting [your notice], I should indulge hopes of regaining your 
kindness,—& if you will so far favor me, I will gladly kiss the Rod.
But if, after all, I have only wearied you, do not think me so weak 
as to wish to teaze you into writing—I could not forbear sending this 
remonstrance, but will not trouble you again, unless you should again 
desire it.—which I only fear you should now do, out of Compliment, or 
compassion—however, I will not further pester you, but only subscribe 
myself,
My dear daddy
Your ever affectionate
& obliged
Frances Burney.
If you should write, I conjure you to let it be with frankness.39
When Burney writes about people whom she admires or considers 
personally sympathetic, she finds ways of making them embed complex 
mental states even when they cannot do it in words. Mr Omai was a 
Tahitian who had been drawn into the Burney “family circle”40 through 
the efforts of Frances’s brother James. On several occasions in the 
journal, Mr Omai, who is portrayed as a perfect gentleman and “living 
con firma tion of the myth of the ‘Noble Savage,’”41 is shown to convey 
complex layering of social consciousness by his body language. Here 
39  Frances Burney, The Early Journals and Letters of Fanny Burney, vol. 2, 1774–1777, ed. 
Lars E. Troide (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 1–2 
(emphasis in the original). References are to this edition.
40  Kate Chisholm, “The Burney Family,” in The Cambridge Companion to Frances 
Burney, 16.
41  Lars E. Troide, introduction to The Early Journals and Letters of Fanny Burney, vol. 2, 
1774–1777, xii.
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is their conversation about theatre, reported in the journal entry of 14 
December 1775: “We then enquired how he liked the Theatres, but 
could not make him understand us; though with a most astonishing 
politeness, he always endeavoured, by his Bows & smiles, to save us the 
trouble of knowing that he was not able to comprehend whatever we 
said” (195). 
Although Mr Omai did not understand what Burney and her friends 
were asking him on this occasion, he did not want them to think that 
his lack of understanding should hinder their communication. In an 
earlier letter to Samuel Crisp, Burney writes that Mr Omai “must cer-
tainly possess an uncommon share of observation and attention” (62). 
Describing him as generating complex embedments “with the assistance 
of signs, & Action” (193) and thus engaging in “the responsive mir ror ing 
of self and others,”42 she constructs a vivid proof of that asser tion. This 
is in direct contrast to Evelina, in which the capacity for em bedment 
usually manifests itself as a linguistic capac ity, and readers are encouraged 
to assume that characters incapable of constructing sophisticated verbal 
embedments are also incapable of experiencing truly complex social 
emotions.43
Complex verbal embedments and sophisticated feelings still largely 
go together in Burney’s later works, but the correlation between embed-
ment and amicability becomes less straightforward. For instance, 
Burney’s second novel, Cecilia (1782), features at least one eloquent 
high-embedder—Mr Moncton—whose repugnant Machiavellianism 
nearly destroys the main heroine. 
Also, Cecilia takes more chances with its tradesmen. In Evelina, the 
only occasion when a character who has no legit imate pretentions to 
gentility may embed more mental states than a “true” gentleman is when 
the non-gentleman plans to exploit the gentle man or cheat him out 
42  Yeazell, 142.
43  For instance, M. Du Bois, who does not speak English, embeds on the third level 
in French (see 243). One possible exception is when Lady Howard’s coachman and 
footman play a prank aimed at humbling Mme Duval. The two men pretend to be 
lost in the woods, but are obviously lying—and thus nesting mental states on the 
second and third level. What they say stays on the first level of nesting at one point: 
“‘I think we should turn to the left,’ said the footman. ‘To the left!’ answered the 
[coachman], ‘No, no, I’m partly sure we should turn to the right.’” At other moments, 
their speech contains no mental states at all: “‘Let’s try this lane,’ said the footman. 
‘No,’ said the coachman, ‘that’s the road to Canterbury; we had best go straight on.’ 
‘Why that’s the direct London road,’ returned the footman, ‘and will lead us twenty 
miles about’” (145). Yet, they presumably nest mental states on a deeper level than 
they reveal in their half-smothered-with-laughter speeches.
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of his money. In contrast, although Cecilia’s aristo cratic and otherwise 
genteel characters consistently embed mental states on a higher level 
than shopkeepers, the correlation between the capacity for complex 
embedments and social class is less rigid. Some tradesmen (or their 
children, such as Henrietta Belfield and her brother)44 are allowed to 
embed—and hence feel—as deeply, or nearly as deeply, as Cecilia herself. 
We seemed to have moved beyond the simple hierarchy according to 
which servants may get by without embedding any mental states (at 
least not verbally) and tradespeople might muster one or two, while 
ladies and gentlemen of leisure effortlessly weave third- to fourth-level 
embedments into almost everything they say.
To the extent to which writers may be said to make an intuitive 
decision about which of their characters will be capable of embedding 
more mental states than others, when it comes to eighteenth-century 
Britain, it is tempting to read social class as the key factor in that deci-
sion. Yet the relationship between class and sociocognitive complexity 
is never unambiguous. On the one hand, we have Richard Steele’s The 
Conscious Lovers (1722), based on Terence’s Andria (166 BCE), which 
reverses the embedment pattern present in the original play. In Andria, 
the slave named Davos masterminds a plot to save his master, Pamphilus, 
from a marriage arranged by Pamphilus’s father; in The Conscious Lovers, 
a similar plot is hatched by Bevil Jr., the son of Sir John Bevil, while 
Tom, Bevil Jr.’s servant and the character based on Davos, merely helps 
out. He is never allowed to think on the same level as, or above, his 
aristo cratic master. On the other hand, we have Samuel Richardson’s 
Pamela (1740), in which a servant girl outthinks, outwrites, and “out-
embeds” her aristocratic would-be seducer, leaving him no option but 
to accept their relationship on her terms. Differentially layered social 
con sciousness appears to be a powerful rhetorical tool avail able to 
writers, but we are still in the early stages of understanding its role in the 
history of dialogic imagination.
•
44  See Zunshine, “1700–1775: Theory of Mind, Social Hierarchy, and the Emergence 
of Narrative Subjectivity,” in The Emergence of Mind: Representations of Consciousness 
in Narrative Discourse in English, ed. David Herman (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2011), 161–86.
